An important policy issue in the United States, at present and for at least the past three decades, is the spatial distribution of economic activity within metropolitan areas. Urban problems such as centrally concentrated poverty and crime, fiscal stress, blight, and sprawl have all been tied to the continuing redistribution of employment and residence from central cities and their inner-ring suburbs to the periphery of metropolitan areas in the United States.
1 This redistribution of economic activity has also expanded the metropolitan labor market issue of a spatial mismatch between low-skilled workers and their potential employers. The low skilled are more likely to reside in central cities and inner suburbs, whereas potential employers of the low skilled are increasingly more likely to be located in the outer suburbs.
Policy makers in affected central cities and inner-ring suburbs have not been content to let this shift in economic activity go uncontested and have responded with a host of incentives designed to alter business location decisions. Local incentives granted to business have taken a number of forms, including property tax forgiveness, tax increment financing authorities (TIFAs), industrial development bonds (IDBs), downtown development authorities (DDAs), and other related activities. 2 Since the 1970s, the use of such locally initiated incentives has increased dramatically throughout the United States. Bartik (1991 Bartik ( , 1994 offers both equity-and efficiency-based arguments in support of appropriately used local incentives to business in a metropolitan area. From an equity standpoint, high local taxation and inadequate business services discourage firms from locating in cities that are also more likely to have a greater percentage of poor people within their boundaries. The results are even higher local taxes paid by the poor, a lower level of local public services provided to the poor, and reduced employment opportunities for those most in need. An incentive offer by a high-tax/low-service city could be used to counteract this regressive chain of events. From an efficiency viewpoint, local incentives can also correct the failure of the market to appropriately value an additional job in a city experiencing high unemployment. The creation of a job in a city experiencing high rates of residential unemployment can generate social benefits beyond the wage paid to a worker. In addition, the creation of a new job at the core of a metropolitan area usually generates less additional public infrastructure costs than one created at its periphery.
Concurrently, the use of local development incentives to attract business capital and employment to a specific jurisdiction results in forgone local tax revenue, if the business receiving them would have located there without it. In one sense, these incentives can therefore be considered a success if they direct economic development to an area where, but for the incentive, it would not otherwise have occurred. If the offering of a local incentive accomplishes this goal, the forgone local tax revenue may well be justified.
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This article is an empirical examination of the efficacy of local development incentives within a metropolitan area. Since such an examination must consider many interrelated variables, we use a system of simultaneous regression equations that account for differences in the local employment rate, local poverty rate, and local nonresidential property values. We draw data from the 112 communities in the Detroit metropolitan area over the period 1977 to 1992. Since the ability to offer local incentives has existed in the metropolitan Detroit area since the mid-1970s, it provides a rich laboratory from which to investigate the use of local development incentives and to draw policy lessons regarding them for the rest of the United States.
In the next section, we offer a brief review of recent empirical studies related to the use of local development incentives and spatial mismatch in a metropolitan area. The third section offers a summary of our modeling strategy and descriptive statistics for all variables used in the regression analyses. The fourth section includes regression results. The policy implications drawn from our empirical examination are found in the fifth section.
PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL STUDIES Bartik (1991) provides an extensive examination of previous regression work measuring the effect of state and local fiscal variables on economic development. He concludes that these studies yield the consensus view that local taxes and expenditures do exert a statistically significant influence on the level of economic activity observed in a region or locality. Furthermore, this impact increases in magnitude as one compares inter-area studies to intra-area studies.
A direct extension of Bartik's literature review is the meta-regression analysis performed by Phillips and Goss (1995) . 4 Phillips and Goss regress the tax elasticities of various measures of business activity recorded in Bartik (1991) against dummy variables thought to capture factors that account for an effective econometric study. Table 1 contains their findings. The intercept value of -0.216 is the average tax elasticity of business activity for inter-area studies that do not control for fixed effects and public services. The average tax elasticity in an intra-metropolitan study grows to -1.250 (-0.216 -1.034) . If the average intra-metropolitan study also controls for local public services that benefit business, the tax elasticity of business activity grows to -1.482 (-1.250 -0.232).
Insert Table 1 about here
Bartik found few pre-1991 regression studies that directly examined the influence of local incentives on local economic development. We next offer some more recent findings from intra-area studies that account for local incentives and from other intra-area studies that continue to evaluate the influence of local fiscal variables. Anderson (1990) found that the average rate of growth of property value for Michigan cities with a TIFA was higher than the average rate of growth for similar cities that had not adopted a TIFA. Wassmer (1994) offers a regression study of whether local incentive use in the Detroit metropolitan area both pulls a city's long-term trend in business activity above what it would have been without the offer and generates the desired additive effect. However, in only 5 of the 16 possibilities in
Wassmer's study, where an incentive could demonstrate an additive influence, were the regression coefficients for local incentive use statistically significantly from zero and positive. Luce (1994) conducted an ambitious and well-executed study of the influence of local taxes and public services on the intrametropolitan location of both firms and households in metropolitan Philadelphia. For total employment, he estimated short-and long-run property tax elasticities of -0.4 and -1.0, respectively. incentives only to compensate for local characteristics that repel businesses. Using a duration model, they find evidence that a city is more likely to offer its first manufacturing property tax abatement (holding all else constant) the longer that it waits to do it. We attribute this finding to the development of copycat behavior over time. Such emulation, by communities not exhibiting characteristics that repel business, can only reduce the sway that local incentives have when offered by communities exhibiting such characteristics. Dardia (1998) matched census blocks within a California city's TIFA district with comparable census blocks in the city, but not contained within the district. The mean assessed increase in value for a parcel in a TIFA census block was 265% over the thirteen-year period examined, compared to a mean assessed value growth of only 149% for non-TIFA parcels.
The empirical literature on intra-metropolitan job accessibility, or spatial mismatch, began with Kain (1968) . He advances three hypotheses relating to the issue: 1) the geographic distribution of minority employment is influenced by residential housing segregation, 2) the difficulty that minorities find with living in many U.S. suburbs increases this group's unemployment, and 3) the suburbanization of jobs magnifies the effect that housing segregation has on minority unemployment. Ihlanfeldt's (1992) review of 30 empirical studies based upon Kain's hypotheses supports the influence of residential housing segregation on the distribution of minority employment in U.S. metropolitan areas. In his own research, Ihlanfeldt documented the negative employment and education effects spatial mismatch has had on African American teenagers and other young adults in the city of Philadelphia. Holzer, Ihlanfeldt, and Sjoquist (1994) found that central-city residents do not offset greater suburbanization of employment with greater distance traveled to either search for work or commute to a job. Raphael (1998) finds that accessibility to employment opportunities explains 30% to 50% of the differences in neighborhood employment rates between African American and White youths in San Francisco Bay Area census blocks. Holzer (1996) , in a very thorough survey, learns that African Americans who reside in the city of Detroit are twice as likely to apply for a job in the central city than in the suburbs.
We conclude that there are both theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that local fiscal variables and development incentives can alter the intra-metropolitan location of business firms. There is also empirical evidence of the existence and negative effects of intra-metropolitan spatial mismatch in local labor markets. It is reasonable, therefore, to bring these two issues together and ask whether local incentives affect local residential rates of employment and/or local poverty rates. If local incentives can be used to raise overall rates of local residential employment or that of the low-skilled, then perhaps targeted local incentives can be used to reduce the continuing redistribution of economic activity from the core to the fringe of many U.S. metropolitan areas and help alleviate the resulting spatial mismatch in a metropolitan area's labor market.
MODELING STRATEGY AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
We are interested in examining the effect of a local incentive offer on the value of local manufacturing and commercial property bases, as well as the subsequent effect of the change in these nonresidential property bases on the value of local residential employment and poverty rates. To do this, we develop a model of a metropolitan area economy that explains differences in local residential employment rates, local poverty rates, and the value of local manufacturing and commercial property tax bases. A system of simultaneous equations, estimated by using the econometric method of two-stage least squares, takes into account the interrelationships between these variables and other causal factors, such as local economic development incentives and local fiscal variables.
Key indicators of the efficacy of local incentives in a metropolitan area are their positive influence on the value of local nonresidential property values and a subsequent positive (negative) influence of these property values on local residential employment rates (poverty rates). At least one of these impacts is necessary if the appropriate use of local incentives is to reduce spatial mismatch in a metropolitan area's labor market. We therefore begin our modeling of the necessary intra-metropolitan relationships related to the efficacy of local incentives with an equation representing the determinants of the residential employment rate in a city in a metropolitan area.
Many of the behavioral and structural relationships presented next are associated with decisions made by a jurisdiction's policy makers. In modeling these decisions, we assume that they reflect the behavior of a decisive voter maximizing utility subject to constraints. average surrounding property in manufacturing activity, average surrounding property in commercial activity, average surrounding residential employment).
Manufacturing property value
Local manufacturing property value is equal to the real market value of the manufacturing property tax base in a jurisdiction. 8 Demand factors that drive the value of business property within a community are fiscal attractiveness, geographic attractiveness, and local incentives for manufacturing.
Supply factors that drive the value of local business property are city size and local land use decisions.
The percentage of a city's property value composed of manufacturing property proxies for local decisions related to manufacturing activity. In addition, characteristics of local residents are included as representations of factors that could influence a jurisdiction's nonresidential zoning decisions. The fiscal attractiveness of a community is a positive function of its per-resident municipal expenditure and a negative function of local taxation. The preponderance of manufacturing firms in adjacent communities also reflects the geographic attractiveness of a city site to manufacturing. Local economic development incentives that apply to manufacturing firms are IDBs and manufacturing property tax abatements. By attempting to include interactive variables equivalent to IDBs or manufacturing property tax abatements offered locally in a given year, and zero for other years, we test the proposition that these incentives exert different effects on manufacturing property value in different years. population with less than high school, percentage property in manufacturing activity, average surrounding property in manufacturing activity).
Commercial property value
With only slight modification, we apply the model for local manufacturing property value to local commercial property value. The same factors that underlie the amount of local land available for manufacturing use determine the supply of local land available for commercial development. Local incentives intended to increase the demand for a community's commercial sites and thus their value are the establishment of a DDA, the presence of a TIFA, or the offering of commercial property tax abatements.
Local commercial incentives can again exert different influences on local commercial property value in different years. The value of commercial property in a community is thus: property in commercial activity, average surrounding residential employment). Table 2 contains a description of all the variables contained in equations 1 through 4, as well as other exogenous variables used in the two-stage regression process.
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REGRESSION METHOD AND RESULTS
We use data drawn from the 112 municipalities that make up the Detroit metropolitan area, as well as from the years 1977, 1982, 1987, and 1992 , to estimate each of the four functional relationships just described. 9 In a pooled regression analysis such as this, error terms may be heteroskedastic. One method used to reduce the negative effect of heteroskedastic error terms is a natural log transformation of all variables in a regression equation. The regression coefficient calculated after a log-log transformation is the elasticity, or the percentage change in the dependent variable that results from a 1% change in the explanatory variable. Besides these benefits, where possible it is also appropriate to use a non-linear functional form (like log-log), because the expected relationships between our chosen explanatory and dependent variables are more likely to be non-linear.
Following natural log transformations of the residential employment rate, poverty rate, and commercial property value regressions, we checked for the presence of heteroskedasticity by regressing the square of the regressions' error terms against community square miles in various functional forms. After finding no statistically significant relationship between these three regressions' error terms and community area, we conclude that the log transformation handled any heteroskedasticity that existed without it. Since some communities exhibit no manufacturing activity, the manufacturing property regression must remain in linear form. For this regression, we retrieved and squared the error terms, and found no significant relationship between the squared error terms and community area. We are also satisfied that manufacturing property value regression is free of heteroskedasticity.
The functional explanations given previously for residential employment rate, poverty rate, manufacturing property value, and commercial property values involve a dependent variable determined by exogenous and endogenous variables; thus, two-stage least squares is employed for all four regressions.
The rank and order conditions for identification are satisfied for each. The instrumental variables used to predict the endogenous variables in the first-stage regressions are all the exogenous variables in the system. 10 All regression specifications passed the statistical test of Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) , designed to evaluate the appropriateness of a proposed two-stage regression correction for simultaneity.
In pooled regression analysis, we need also be concerned about unobservable jurisdiction effects that are constant across time and influence the value of each of the four dependent variables. Without controls for these, the estimated impacts of each of the right-side variables are biased. The residential employment rate, poverty rate, and manufacturing and commercial property value regressions were each estimated without jurisdiction effects, with jurisdiction random fixed effects, and with jurisdiction random effects. As described in Greene (1998, chapt. 17) , the appropriate statistical tests indicate that fixed effects is the appropriate way to proceed for all four regressions. An additional concern arises from the combining of data from 4 different years to generate the large pooled data set we use. To account for time-specific effects that may arise through pooling cross-sectional data over time, dummy variables for each of the four cross sections (1977, 1982, 1987, and 1992) are also in all four regressions. Table 3 contains the values of the coefficient of determination (R 2 ) and relevant F-statistics.
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insert Table 3 about here This regression analysis represents one of the best attempts to establish the influence that the offering of local economic development incentives in a metropolitan area has on local residential employment rates, local poverty rates, and local business property values. We base this claim upon our effort to account for the different simultaneous relationships needed to properly ascertain the efficacy of local incentives in a metropolitan area. A description of a few highlights from our regression findings follows.
Residential employment rate
The percentage of the adult population with less than a high school education, average surrounding property in commercial activity, and average surrounding residential employment are three variables that exert a statistically significant and positive influence on the residential employment rate. The percentage of a community's adult population without a high school degree acts as both a positive measure of increased labor supply in the community and a negative measure of decreased labor demand. To earn an appropriate income, a household is more likely to have more than one member working if the other adult members never graduated from high school. At the same time, adults with less than a high school education qualify for fewer of the available jobs. We find that the increased labor supply aspect of residents with less than a high school education dominates and that a 10% increase in the percentage of the local population with this characteristic (holding all else constant) results in a 1.5% increase in the residential employment rate.
Not surprisingly, a greater rate of residential employment occurs in locales surrounded by other communities with a large percentage of their property base in commercial activity and with a larger number of employed residents. A 10% increase in average surrounding residential employment results in a 4.2% increase in the average local residential employment rate. A 10% increase in average surrounding property in commercial activity yields a 0.6% increase in the residential employment rate.
A 10% increase in local manufacturing or commercial property value generates a 0.2% and 0.4% decrease, respectively, in the average local residential employment rate. Although, it is possible that greater nonresidential property value in a community measures greater potential employment opportunities for residents, it also acts as lure for migration into a community. The theoretical effect of an increase in nonresidential property value on the local residential employment rate is uncertain, because it may increase the numerator used to calculate the rate (local residents employed), but it may also increase the denominator (number of residents). We find that the influence on the number of residents is greater.
Poverty rate A community displaying higher percentages of its population young, old, with less than a high A local increase in manufacturing or commercial property value results in a decrease in the local poverty rate. Residents of the Detroit metropolitan area are more likely to find themselves in poverty if their community is lacking in either manufacturing or commercial activity. For the average community over the period observed, a 10% increase in manufacturing property value results in a 0.7% decrease in the poverty rate. Interestingly, a 10% increase in commercial property value is associated with a twice-as-large 1.4% decrease in the poverty rate. Due to a shift to a more service-oriented economy, and to most manufacturing jobs during this period requiring greater skills than many of the poor possess, we are not surprised to find that the poor are more likely to find employment in commercial ventures.
Manufacturing property value
Due to the benefit of agglomeration economies, a city surrounded by cities more involved in manufacturing is also more involved in manufacturing. A 10% increase in average surrounding property in manufacturing results in a 2.1% increase in manufacturing property value. In addition, municipal expenditure per capita has a large positive effect on local manufacturing property value. A 10% rise in municipal expenditure per capita in the average Detroit area jurisdiction increased manufacturing property value by a very elastic 26.2%. As for local economic development incentives, we allow for the possibility that IDBs and manufacturing property tax abatements exert different influences during different years.
However, we find that only manufacturing property tax abatements fit this possibility in a statistically significant manner. In 1977, a 10% increase in the average use of local manufacturing property abatements resulted in about a 0.5% increase in the local manufacturing property base. In 1982 and in 1992, manufacturing abatements resulted in no statistically significant increase in local manufacturing property value. In 1987, alternatively, a 10% increase in manufacturing abatements is associated with about a 0.5% decrease in the local manufacturing property base. The positive influence of manufacturing property tax abatements in the initial period available is likely the result of these incentives being a new economic development tool (after only three years in existence) used by fewer Detroit area municipalities.
If competing communities are not offering abatements, it is not surprising that a community that does so gets a greater return per dollar. The local use of greater IDBs exerted no statistically significant effect on the local manufacturing tax base in any of the observed years.
A 10% increase in the percentage population of young (less than age 18) results in a 6.2% decrease in manufacturing property value. Communities composed of a greater percentage of children are more likely to be zoned as bedroom communities and therefore less likely to permit manufacturing firms. A 10% increase in the percentage population of old (over age 65), alternatively, results in a 3.2% increase in manufacturing property value. Older people may be more tolerant of manufacturing activity within their community, or the association may just be picking up the fact that manufacturing in the Detroit area is concentrated in communities that have been around longer and hence have a greater fraction of older people within them.
Finally, if a community has a larger percentage of its property tax base in manufacturing, it also exhibits a higher manufacturing property value. A 10% increase in this percentage is associated with about a 5% increase in manufacturing property value. The regression coefficients on the time dummies indicate that local manufacturing property value for the average metropolitan community, holding other factors constant, was greatest in 1977 and continually declined through 1992.
Commercial property value
Several of the explanatory variables in the commercial property value regression are demand-side factors intended to capture the type and number of commercial firms desiring to locate in a community.
The significant and positive regression coefficient on the average surrounding property in commercial activity again indicates an agglomeration preference. A 10% increase in this surrounding value yields on average a 7.2% increase in local commercial property value. The percentage of the local property tax base that is in commercial activity also exerts a positive influence on local commercial property value. As agglomeration economies would indicate, commercial property value is larger in cities whose tax base is more commercial.
A city with a larger percentage of its population younger than age 18 and a larger percentage of its adult population not possessing a bachelor's degree has lower commercial property value. This could be due to the demand for commercial property being lower in a city with fewer potential adult customers and with fewer well-educated, hence higher income, adult customers. Our finding that a 10% increase in average surrounding residential employment results in about a 13% increase in local commercial property value reflects the positive effect of potential customers from surrounding jurisdictions on local commercial property value.
Communities that spend more on local services per resident have larger commercial tax bases. This is likely due to the additional provision of municipal services that commercial enterprises desire (such as sanitation, sewage, streets, sidewalks, lighting, and public safety). A 10% increase in real municipal expenditure per resident results in an elastic 12.4% increase in the average community's property value.
Surprisingly, a 1% increase in local property taxes paid per $2,000 of market value of property correlates with a 4.6% increase in local commercial property value. One would expect that a higher local property tax rate, holding all else constant, results in a lower commercial property value. The regression relationship between the local property tax rate and local commercial property value is thus unlikely to be causal.
We tried to allow for the possibility that TIFAs, DDAs, and commercial property tax abatements exert different effects in different years. Unfortunately, the interaction of year dummy variables with the dummies representing the presence of a TIFA or a DDA resulted in perfect collinearity in the regression estimation. Thus, the measured influence of these variables must be calculated as constant across all years.
Communities with at least one TIFA, holding other factors constant, have a commercial property tax base that on average is 12% larger. Communities with a DDA, holding other factors constant, have a commercial property tax base that on average is 25% larger. This does not necessarily mean that the adoption of a TIFA or DDA caused an increase in commercial property value -only that the adoption correlates with it. However, we feel better about this correlation being due to a true causation, because in our simultaneous regression analysis, we have tried to control for the other factors responsible for an increase in commercial property value and the simultaneous determination of local incentive offers and local non-residential property values.
We were able to interact commercial property tax abatements with the year dummies and found that they did exert a significantly different influence in the years they were available and which we examined (1982, 1987, and 1992) . A 10% increase in commercial property tax abatements offered by the average Detroit area community in 1982 resulted in a slight (0.03%) decrease in commercial property value. This decrease reached 0.1% in 1987, and rose to 0.2% in 1992. There is absolutely no evidence that local commercial abatements increase local commercial property value. The negative relationship between the two is possibly due to communities that are losing commercial property value being more likely to respond with an attempt to control the loss through abatement offers -i.e., being more likely to bid for business. However, as with manufacturing abatements and manufacturing property value, the negative influence of the abatement rises over time. The trend is again probably due to communities throughout the metropolitan offering more of this form of incentive as time passes -hence, its effectiveness in communities that really need to use it falling.
Higher local poverty levels are associated with larger local commercial property values. All else being constant, a poorer community is more likely to zone local land for commercial use for the increased local tax revenue that follows. Along the same line, a city with a higher residential employment rate is less likely to zone local land for commercial use. A 10% increase in the residential employment rate is associated with a 29% decrease in commercial property value.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In our model, the offering of local economic development incentives could increase local residential employment rates or lower local poverty rates by first increasing local manufacturing or commercial property values. We find that the local offer of manufacturing property tax abatements only exerted a positive influence on manufacturing property value in 1977. The local offer of commercial property tax abatements never exerted a positive influence on commercial property value, whereas the local use of a TIFA or a DDA did exert a positive influence on commercial property value in all the years examined.
There is a theoretical explanation for our finding that only manufacturing property tax abatements, and not commercial, exert a positive influence on manufacturing property value, and this influence only occurs in the first period observed. Since manufacturing is the more footloose of the two types of business property, manufacturing property tax abatements should exert a greater impact on intra-metropolitan manufacturing location decisions than do similar abatement offers to commercial property. In addition, in the first period (only 3 years after the manufacturing abatement program began), there is less likely to be copycat behavior among jurisdictions. Needy or fiscally blighted jurisdictions offer the abatements because they have to, and other jurisdictions are less likely to offer them just because others are using them.
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The spatial tie between the fruits of a TIFA or a DDA and a specific area within a city may be the reason for our finding a positive influence of these local incentives on local commercial property value. A tax increment finance authority uses the incremental property tax revenue generated after establishment for capital improvements in only the authority's designated area. The downtown development authority does the same, but in an area that must be a central business district.
Even if the offering of a local incentive increases the value of nonresidential property in a community, to be effectively employed as a policy tool to reduce spatial mismatch in a metropolitan area, the increase in nonresidential property value must also increase the local residential employment rate and/or decrease the local poverty rate. We find that an increase in business property value decreases the local poverty rate but also decreases the rate of residential employment. As described earlier, the decrease in the residential employment rate is likely due to an increase in business property value, causing an increase in local population that is greater than the increase in new jobs going to local residents. However, the finding that local poverty declines after the increased use of a local incentive cannot be used to dismiss the notion that properly used local economic development incentives could be used to redirect economic activity back to the core of metropolitan areas and reduce spatial mismatch. However, the reduction in local poverty rate, after the use of a local incentive, may also be the consequence of gentrification or local displacement of the poor, and not the result of providing more employment opportunities to the formerly poor in a city.
Further research is needed to discern the difference.
Partly from our regression findings, we next offer our opinion on the three policy alternatives available for the future use of local economic development incentives in a metropolitan area: free choice, eliminate, or target.
Free choice
The free choice policy option is to continue to allow communities to offer local economic development incentives at their own volition. Under such a laissez faire system, it is conceivable that a policy maker in each community accurately weigh the full costs of granting a local incentive against the local benefits to be gained from it, and only offers an incentive if the benefits exceed the costs to their community. Local costs may include the lost revenue that occurs if the firm would have located there without the incentive, and/or an increase in the local cost of public service provision, and/or a decrease in local environmental quality from the firm locating there. Local benefits may include increased local revenue, and/or increased local employment, and/or the reduced local physical blight that would not have occurred without the incentive.
Mattey and Spiegel (1997) have commented on the efficiency-enhancing aspects of local government competition for business through the offering of local economic development incentives. These include the power to attract and retain firms with a high level of external benefit to a jurisdiction, nurturing industry clusters, and the ability to use local incentives to overcome information problems. Since a locality is more likely to have better information about the quality of the location than does the firm, a properly used incentive signals this quality. In addition, many local government services are tax priced at the average cost of providing them. If the marginal cost of provision to the next firm is less than the average cost, one measure of efficiency calls for the appropriate incentive.
Mattey and Spiegel's argument regarding the efficiency-enhancing result of interjurisdictional competition for business is conceptually sound and grounded in economic theory. However, as Kenyon (1997) points out, it is only entirely valid when the inter-jurisdictional market for business approaches perfect competition. Kenyon describes perfect competition as consisting of many jurisdictions with similar fiscal characteristics, the absence of spillovers between jurisdictions, fully informed voters and policy makers, and governments that seek to maximize the long-term well-being of their constituents. If any of these characteristics are violated, unrestrained municipal competition for business can lead to metropolitanwide, negative-sum outcomes. Based upon the observations of political and institutional researchers such as Rubin (1988) , Goetz and Kayser (1993) , and Wolman and Spitzley (1996) , as well as our own observations of the real world, we come down on the side of a lack of perfect competition in most intrametropolitan markets for business location. Communities do not have equal fiscal resources, and they do engage in strategic behavior over time; a strong argument exists for inter-jurisdictional spillovers of the costs and benefits of local business location; and the focus of locally elected policy makers on reelection may cloud their evaluation of how a local incentive offer affects the long-term fiscal health of their community.
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If local economic development incentives exist to redistribute business activity to a place where it would not otherwise go, and not to reduce overall business tax burdens, we believe that continued free choice in the offering of local incentives is the worst of the three possible policy options. In the case of manufacturing property abatements in metropolitan Detroit, a positive influence on manufacturing property value occurs only shortly after the incentive program began. As time passes, communities are more likely to emulate each other and offer manufacturing abatements, just because others are using them. If abatements are the marginal factor that steers a firm to one community instead of another, that factor becomes less effective when communities are giving such an inducement just because of other community offers. A DDA exerts a positive influence on local commercial property value in any period, but holding all else constant, there is evidence in the data that more communities adopt these authorities as length of time since inception increases.
If communities are offering a local incentive just because others are offering the same incentive, and there is evidence that the local incentive is only serving its purpose shortly after the program began, there are reasons to reconsider the widely used policy of nonrestricted use of local incentives in a metropolitan area. The average distance to downtown Detroit for all communities in our sample is 20.8 miles. Prior to 1977, the communities that offered manufacturing abatements were on average 17.4 miles from Detroit's core. In 1992, the average distance to downtown Detroit for communities offering manufacturing abatements rose to 19.8 miles. Relating this to spatial mismatch, we have found that manufacturing abatements exert their desired effect when on average they are used closer to the metropolitan area's central city -or, as we found, in the first period of their existence. This could be due to the fact that communities exhibiting characteristics more likely to repel manufacturing, and thus in greater need of a compensating differential (local incentive), are closer to the metropolitan core.
Perhaps the calculated benefits of greater local commercial property value from a TIFA or a DDA would also be larger if their use were restricted to communities most in need of them, or exhibiting local characteristics that repel commercial activity. Even commercial abatements or IDBs, which exhibit no positive influence on commercial or manufacturing property value in any year, may have exerted a positive influence on the appropriate nonresidential property value, if their use from inception had been limited to only the most fiscally blighted communities in the metropolitan area.
Eliminate
The value of manufacturing property in the Detroit metropolitan area not subject to property taxes in 1992 was about $15 billion (1990 dollars). In this year, the average community in the Detroit area with any manufacturing property was granting property tax forgiveness to about 35% of the industrial property that it could have taxed. This level of manufacturing abatement activity was equivalent to about $474 million in potential local property tax revenue forgone each year. 13 In addition, in 1992, the total value of commercial property in the Detroit area enjoying property-tax free status due to abatement was about $619 million. This translates into 2.1% of the potential commercial property value in the metropolitan area not Employees, calls for a moratorium on bidding wars over business location and the turning of attention to something that does work (education and infrastructure). He believes that incentives do not create new jobs for a metropolitan area, state, or the nation, but only serve to allocate jobs between different jurisdictions through corporate blackmail. Winners are the mobile businesses that are able to wrestle a tax break from a local government; losers are the businesses that are unable or unwilling to threaten mobility. Lynch (1996) , through a selective reading of the previous empirical literature on this topic and a questionable conclusion that incentives cannot alter business location, comes to a similar conclusion. Burstein and Rolnick (1995) are also of this opinion and support their opinion based upon the theoretic model of Holmes (1995) . Burstein and Rolnick believe that there is a role for state and local government competition, but only through overall state and local fiscal policy. As Tiebout (1956) was the first to point out, such rivalry can lead to a more efficient allocation of both public and private goods. But, as shown in Holmes' model, when state and local governments compete with each other for the increase in property tax base offered by a specific business and do not consider the positive and negative externalities of business location that spill across jurisdiction boundaries, a national underproduction of public goods occurs, due to less subnational tax revenue being collected throughout the country. Burstein and Rolnick point out that subnational governments, acting on their own interest, are not going to stop this behavior. 14 Holmes' model assumes that states (or local governments) compete with each other only to enlarge their own tax base. As Holmes acknowledges, a subnational government may also want a business to locate within its boundaries because of a positive social externality bestowed upon residents. In this case, the offering of subsidies and tax breaks by governments in which the externality is largest increases the total amount of socially benefiting activity generated from the industry. Holmes concludes: "To the extent that this is true, banning tax discrimination by states might reduce aggregate welfare" (p. 39).
Among the three available options (free choice, banning, or regulation), the outright ban on all local economic development incentives in a metropolitan area is not our preferred policy choice. We agree with a total prohibition on local incentive offers, if the only other policy option is continued free rein. We prefer the targeted use of local incentives by only fiscally blighted communities.
Target Bartik (1991) offers and tests a theory of the hysteresis effect of local job growth. Simply summarized, his hysteresis argument maintains that most households are immobile in the short run (perhaps even in the long run, in the case of minorities in U.S. central cities); and therefore, local job growth in high-unemployment areas has a permanent effect on the local labor market. Local job growth leads to long-run changes in the vicinity's human capital, and these changes reduce local unemployment levels even beyond the initial effect of the job growth.
Similar forms of labor market hysteresis occur when local economic development incentives effectively increase labor demand in high-unemployment localities within a metropolitan area. It is for this reason that our preferred policy prescription for the future use of local incentives in a metropolitan area is state or federal-based encouragement (through intergovernmental revenue sharing) or regulation that targets the use of local incentives to only high-unemployment and fiscally blighted areas.
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The statistical evidence given above, and further detailed in Anderson and Wassmer (2000) , shows
that, left to their own devices, communities that do not exhibit high unemployment and fiscal blight increasingly offer local economic development incentives. Since a strong argument exists for the social benefits that arise when only these communities are able to offer incentives, and a state does possess the constitutional power to restrict the offering of all local incentives within its boundaries, targeting is the clear policy recommendation that follows. Bartik (1994) , after his extensive research on this topic, offers essentially the same policy advice. We believe that grass roots sentiment for the targeting of local incentives can come even from metropolitan areas within a state, if they are made aware of the non-efficacy of the current system of unrestricted local choice and the social benefits of incentives offered in only targeted communities. Perhaps a political coalition of central cities and the inner-ring suburbs that are now increasingly hurt by urban sprawl can be put together to support such changes.
NOTES
1 See Downs (1994) for one description of the relationship between suburbanization and urban problems in the United
States.
2 The incentive programs listed are the major ones traditionally offered to business. Newer forms of economic development programs became popular in the 1980s and include assistance in business decisions and employee training. Since these new wave economic development policies usually arise at the state level, and data on their local use are difficult to acquire, this article examines only the traditional forms of local economic development incentives.
3 In other words, it is legitimate to consider that the glass is half full instead of being half empty.
4 A meta-regression analysis is a formal method of estimating factors responsible for differences in regression coefficients found in a literature survey. 5 Chapter 3 in Fisher's (1995) textbook on state and local public finance provides a review of how economists view local public choice.
6 For a more complete description of the theory behind these relationships, see Chapter 4 in Anderson and Wassmer (2000) .
7 Fischel (1985, p. 23 ) observed that "it is possible with a little forethought (and sometimes just afterthought) to exclude most manufacturing and commercial activities" in U.S. municipalities through local zoning practices. 8 The real market value of manufacturing (commercial) property in a Michigan community is equal to the assessed value of manufacturing (commercial) property plus the assessed value of manufacturing (commercial) property granted abatement, all multiplied by two. It is necessary to add the abated property back in, because it is taken off the official property tax rolls. The assessed value of property is multiplied by two because Michigan's property tax system requires assessment of all classes of property at 50% of true market value. 9 The Detroit metropolitan area consists of Macomb, Oakland, and Wayne counties. This is the 1970 definition of the Detroit Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA). In 1990, the Detroit MSA also included Lapeer, Livingston, Monroe, and St. Claire counties. The more limited 1970 definition is used because it better accounts for a region where cities are more likely to compete with each other for the location of the same businesses.
10 The method to appropriately estimate a simultaneous system of structural regression equations is described in Gujarati Source: Phillips and Goss (1995) . Although not reported, all regressions include a set of 112 dummy variables equal to one for a specific city. As a group, the set of municipal dummies were also significant at greater than a 95% confidence level in all four regressions.
a All columns report results from the two-stage, least squares regression method with a sample size of 448 for 112 cities observed over four years.
b The blank cells in the table occur because either the explanatory variable and dependent variable are the same, or the given explanatory variable is not expected to exert an influence on the respective dependent variable. c *** Indicates two-tailed significance at the 99% confidence level or higher, ** indicates significance at 95% to 99% confidence level, * indicates significance at 85% to 95% confidence level. All based on two-tailed tests.
